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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT: A
SWORD OR SHIELD FOR RECOVERY
FROM THE GOVERNMENT FOR
NEGLIGENT HAZARDOUS
WASTE DISPOSAL?
The dangers of hazardous waste to both the community and the en-
vironment require regulation of toxic waste disposal.' Awareness of
waste management problems has spawned broad legislation in recent
years.2 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) represents one legislative enactment?
CERCLA identifies property owners as the primary targets for liability
for the effects of hazardous waste and its cleanup.' The strict liability
standard implicit in CERCLA forces an owner to pay for cleanup costs
even in cases where the waste was improperly disposed of without an
actual violation by the owner.5 Due to the extensive costs of safe
1. See Rich, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of
CERCLA Section 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. Atu. L. REv. 643, 645-46 (1986) (discussing
CERCLA generally and focusing on individual liability based upon involvement in gen-
eration and disposal of hazardous waste).
2. Id. at 643. The two major acts addressing hazardous waste problems are the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1982), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
4. See infra notes 17, 27-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of parties liable
under CERCLA.
5. For instance, an owner is liable for hazardous waste on the property although the
contamination occurred prior to his ownership of the property. See infra notes 24-26
and accompanying text for background on the strict liability standard in CERCLA.
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cleanup and storage of hazardous waste,6 owners often look to other
responsible parties for contribution or reimbursement.7 A private
party's use of tort law as a means toward obtaining damage recovery or
compelling waste cleanup proves particularly difficult when a federal
agency is responsible for the improper disposal.'
This Note analyzes the use of a private action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to recover damages for negligent disposal of
hazardous waste. First, Part I describes the legislation concerning the
disposal and cleanup of hazardous waste, primarily focusing on CER-
CLA's scope and liability.9 Then, Part II analyzes FTCA claims and
exceptions with respect to tortious acts concerning hazardous waste
disposal.1" Finally, Part III critiques a recent successful FTCA claim
involving improper waste disposal.11
I. LIABILrrY UNDER CERCLA
Recent hazardous waste legislation represents Congress' attempt to
develop a comprehensive plan addressing toxic waste management.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)'2 focuses on
regulation of storage and disposal of hazardous waste.13 RCRA, how-
6. For example, an EPA study in 1979 estimated cleanup costs between $13.1 and
$22.1 billion for under 2,000 sites posing a serious threat to the public. H.R. REP. No.
96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6125.
7. This Note addresses use of an FTCA action to recover damages caused by waste
disposal. CERCLA, however, authorizes private parties to recover response costs from
responsible parties under § 107. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text for a
discussion of private response action under CERCLA.
8. In Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577 (11th Cir. 1989), however, the
Eleventh Circuit held the federal government liable to a private party for damages
caused by improper waste disposal. Notably, though, an independent contractor hired
by a Defense Department agency handled the actual transport and disposal. See infra
notes 89-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Dickerson decision.
9. See infra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 31-98 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 99-162 and accompanying text.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
13. In RCRA, Congress limits the focus to regulation of transportation, storage and
disposal of hazardous waste. Id. § 6924. The Act applies prospectively and does not
specifically address the problems caused by existing and abandoned waste sites. RCRA
§ 6902(b) states the national policy behind RCRA:
The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States that,
wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated
as expeditiously as possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated should be treated,
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ever, does not address the problem of abandoned hazardous waste
sites. 4 Consequently, Congress filled this regulatory gap by enacting
CERCLA.15
CERCLA covers cleanup of existing solid waste sites which pose a
dangerous or potentially dangerous risk to the community and the en-
vironment. 6 CERCLA provides a list of "responsible parties" liable
for cleanup costs.17 Responsible parties include generators and trans-
porters of hazardous waste as well as past and present site owners.
18
The responsibilities and liabilities imposed by CERCLA explicitly ap-
ply to government agencies, private individuals, and private
organizations.19
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) utilizes CERCLA
provisions to protect the environment from hazardous waste expo-
stored or disposed of so as to minimize the present and future threat to human
health and the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (Supp. 1987).
14. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119-6128. See Rich, supra note 1, at 646-649 (discussing
RCRA's provisions and deficiencies).
15. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-6 (1982). Examination of CERCLA's legislative history
reveals its goal to establish "a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to
abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous
waste sites." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6125. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of financing for cleanup under CERCLA.
17. CERCLA Section 107 lists the responsible parties:
(1) the owner and operator of a ... facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of re-
sponse costs, of a hazardous substance....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
18. Id.
19. CERCLA § 107(g) states, "[e]ach department, agency, or instrumentality of
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government shall be sub-
ject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both
procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under
this section." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(g) (1982).
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sure.2" CERCLA authorizes the EPA to clean up existing dangerous
waste sites2 using federal funds.22 The EPA may obtain the federal
funds to finance the cleanup and then seek recovery from any of the
"responsible parties."23 Ordinarily, courts hold property owners
whose land contains hazardous waste24 strictly liable25 for the response
costs incurred in the cleanup of the waste.26
20. See Rich, supra note 1, at 650-53.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1) (1982). This section authorizes the President to remove
waste which poses an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.
Id. Congress delegated this authority to the EPA, among other agencies. See Rich,
supra note 1, at 650 n.66. CERCLA also permits the EPA to seek an injunction to
prevent an imminent release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). See
United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (CERCLA § 9606 authorizes
the EPA to seek emergency injunctive relief).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982). "Superfund" is the common name for the Hazardous
Response Trust Fund. Id. The fund consists primarily of revenue generated by taxing
oil and chemical producers. See 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). Superfund allows the EPA to
finance cleanup quickly to prevent further harm to the environment. See Rich, supra
note 1, at 650 n.63.
23. Section 107 describes the responsible parties and the extent of liability. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). Section 107 also authorizes private action against responsible
persons for response costs incurred in certain instances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B)
(1982). See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Liability for response costs can
be joint and several. See Rich, supra note 1, at 656. Therefore, either the EPA or a
private party can sue a responsible party for the full amount of the response costs. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
24. CERCLA lists three defenses to liability of a responsible party. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b) (1)-(4) (1982). These include: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; and (3) a
third party defense if the act or omission was caused solely by a third party acting
without authority and outside of a contractual relationship with the responsible party.
42 U.S.C. 9607(b) (1982). Courts have also interpreted the third party defense to place
an affirmative duty of due care on the responsible party. See generally Note, The Practi-
cal Significance of the Third Party Defense Under CERCLA, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 383 (1988).
25. CERCLA states that the standard of liability shall be the same as under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982). See 42
U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982). Although strict liability is not mentioned specifically in the
FWPCA, courts could interpret the statute to provide a strict liability standard. See
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (city sued generators for cleanup costs of waste illegally dumped in city landfill).
See also Note, supra note 24, at 385 n.17.
26. Response costs refers to the costs incurred in the site cleanup. These include:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
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CERCLA includes a private party's cleanup costs in its catalog of
responsible parties' potential liability.2 7 Courts have used this refer-
ence to private response costs to recognize the opportunity for private
CERCLA action." A private party may sue responsible parties for
reimbursement of cleanup costs expended pursuant to the national con-
tingency plan.29 Potential CERCLA liability of a plaintiff as a respon-
sible party does not bar a private response cost action. 0
II. FTCA CLAIM
The exorbitant cleanup costs of a hazardous waste site can make
CERCLA liability a crippling expense for a property owner.31 As the
property owner is most readily identified as a responsible party, he is
often subject to the full amount of an EPA claim for response costs. 32
Although CERCLA places responsibility and liability on each actor in
the "chain-of-hands" carrying waste,3 3 the site owner must overcome a
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss resulting from
such a release.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) (4) (A)-(C) (1982).
27. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B) provides that responsible parties "shall be liable for
.. any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan .. " 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B) (1982).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 223
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (general concepts of joint and several liability used to support private
cause of action); State v. Shore Realty, 648 F. Supp. 255, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (owner
of hazardous waste site sued 95 responsible parties for contribution to response costs);
State v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1485 (D. Colo. 1985) (private action by mining
company against owners of surrounding property with access to lateral tunnel for con-
tribution). The national contingency plan (NCP) also recognizes that CERCLA § 107
creates a private cause of action. 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a) (1) (1989).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B) (1982). The NCP outlines the procedure for waste
removal, including analysis of remedial alternatives, choosing a cost effective response,
and allowing for public involvement in the choice or remedy. 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a) (2)
(ii) (A).(D) (1989). A private party is not required to get prior government approval
before undertaking a cleanup project. Shore Realty, 648 F. Supp. at 264. The plaintiff
must prove consistency with the NCP at trial. Id.
30. Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 669 F.
Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (owner of contaminated landfill sued generators for re-
sponse costs).
31. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for an example of estimated cleanup
costs.
32. See, e.g., Shore Realty, 648 F. Supp. 255, 258 (owner of hazardous waste site
sued 95 responsible parties for contribution to response costs).
33. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text for discussion of responsible par-
ties under CERCLA.
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difficult obstacle to obtain recovery when the federal government is a
responsible party.
Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act3" to allow private ac-
tions against the federal government for torts caused by government
employees.35 The basic rule prevents private actions against the
United States unless the legislature made the government amenable to
suit.36 If a private person would be liable under the laws of the state
where the act or omission occurred, the FTCA waives sovereign immu-
nity.37 However, two exceptions to the immunity waiver frequently
arise. First, the discretionary function exception protects the govern-
ment from tort liability for damages allegedly arising from a govern-
ment agency or employee's discretionary function or duty.38 Second,
the negligence of an independent contractor will not trigger the sover-
eign immunity waiver,39 as independent contractors are not govern-
ment employees under the FTCA.4
A. Discretionary Function Exception
Congress intended the discretionary function exception 4' to protect
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Congress enacted the FTCA with redress for "gar-
den variety torts" in mind. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953). Although
the FTCA limits sovereign immunity, the Act is not intended to interfere with govern-
ment decision-making. During hearings on the immunity waiver, proponents cited the
negligent operation of motor vehicles as a common example of a type of claim covered
under FTCA. H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1939), noted in Dalehite,
346 U.S. at 28-29 nn. 19-21.
36. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 30. The legislature must authorize an action against the
United States government in order to pierce the sovereign immunity. Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1982). Notably, the FTCA requires private plaintiffs to
state claims for which a private actor would be liable under applicable state law. Id.
Even if the claim successfully avoids the defenses to the immunity waiver the court
must scrutinize the underlying tort claim.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). There is no liability for "any claim ... based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary func-
tion or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused." Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982). The statute exempts any "discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government .. " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1982).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982). The FTCA specifically excludes independent contrac-
tors from the definition of federal agency. Id. See Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521,
526-27 (1973).
41. See supra note 38 for text of the discretionary function exception.
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policy-making and government decisions from tort liability.42 How-
ever, determining the type of decision or decision-maker falling under
the exception makes the exception clearer in theory than in application.
The Supreme Court first addressed the scope and application of the
discretionary function exception in Dalehite v. United States.43  In
Dalehite, a shipment of fertilizer manufactured by the government ex-
ploded, injuring many people and killing several others.' The plaintiff
alleged that the explosion resulted from the government's negligence
by adopting a fertilizer export program, and by controlling various
phases of the manufacture, production, and distribution of the prod-
uct.45 Additionally, the plaintiff alleged the government's negligence
in failing to notify persons handling the product of its dangerous na-
ture.46 The district court agreed, holding the government liable for
damages.47 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court decision. 48 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to in-
terpret the FTCA language, and held that the FTCA discretionary
function exception shielded the government from liability.49
In making its determination, the Supreme Court articulated a broad
test based on the nature of the employee's act, extending the discretion-
ary function exception to government decisions beyond the initiation of
programs and policies.50 Accordingly, regardless of the rank of the
employee, an employee decision allowing room for judgment and pol-
icy considerations falls within the exception.51 The Court also ex-
tended the bar on liability to cover non-discretionary actions taken by a
subordinate executing a discretionary decision made at the planning
42. Congress included the discretionary function exception in the FTCA to "pre-
vent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
social, economic, and political policy through the medium of a tort suit." United States
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814
(1984) (commercial aircraft owner brought FTCA action to recover cost of destroyed
aircraft).
43. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
44. Id. at 17.
45. Id. at 23, 24.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 24.
48. 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 35-36.
51. Id. at 36.
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level. 5
2
Dalehite's broad language led to inconsistent interpretations of the
scope of the discretionary function exception.53 Inconsistent interpre-
tations concerning the importance of planning versus operational label-
ling of an action undercut the strength of Dalehite as the controlling
authority on the discretionary function exception. 54 One important as-
pect of the exception provides that abuse of discretion does not pre-
clude government immunity from tort liability.55 The Dalehite court
focused not on whether the agency actually exercised discretion and
judgment, but instead on the susceptibility of an action to policy con-
siderations.56 Courts have consistently held that the absence of actual
consideration of policy factors does not remove the decision or action
52. Id. at 35-36. The Dalehite court left unclear the relevance of the distinction
between the planning and operational stages of a government action. Although Dalehite
applied the same discretionary test to employees regardless of status, the court distin-
guished between decisions made at the planning level and those at the operational level.
Id. at 33, 42. The court stated that the government was not liable based upon the
actions in the claim, concluding that all of the alleged negligent acts were made at the
planning level. Id. at 42. The court undermined its proclaimed analysis of the actions
based upon the nature of the act by adding planning/operational labels.
53. See Fishback and Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal
Torts Claims Act, Dalehite to Varig to Berkowitz, 25 IDAHo L. REv. 291, 295-96 (1988).
The language of Dalehite allowed application of the discretionary function exception to
almost all actions of government agencies or employees. Id. at 296. Dalehite inter-
preted the discretionary function exception to include any decision "where there is
room for policy [and] judgement .. " 346 U.S. at 36. Lower courts inconsistently
interpreted the limits of this phrase. Fishback and Killefer, supra, at 296. For instance,
in cases of extreme or numerous injuries, many courts interpreted Dalehite as narrowly
as possible in order to allow recovery. Id.
54. Fishback and Killefer, supra note 53, at 296-97. The Supreme Court addressed
the planning/operational distinction in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955). Although subsequently distinguished because the case was not based directly on
the discretionary function exception, courts frequently discuss Indian Towing for its
post-Dalehite treatment of the planning/operational distinction. Fishback and Killefer,
supra note 53, at 296-97. In Indian Towing, the Court found that the initial decision to
operate the lighthouse was an exercise of discretion. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
However, once the government decided to operate the lighthouse, the negligent opera-
tion subjected the government to liability under the FTCA. Id.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982) provides that the FTCA is inapplicable to "any
claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty.., whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
Id.
56. 346 U.S. at 33-34. Committee reports stated that the discretionary function
exception precludes an action for "abuse of discretionary authority - whether or not
negligence is alleged to have been involved." 88 CONG. Rnc. 313-14 (1942), quoted in
346 U.S. at 33.
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from the sphere of discretion.57
Although cases after Dalehite appeared to narrow the discretionary
function exception, the Supreme Court in United States v. S.A. Em-
presa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)5" strongly sup-
ported the Dalehite analysis.59 In Varig Airlines an airline and the
families of victims of an airplane crash sued the government to recover
damages for the destroyed aircraft and wrongful death, respectively.'
The Court stressed that the discretionary function exception is not lim-
ited to government regulatory action.61 Additionally, the Court reiter-
ated that the discretionary function exception may apply to any level of
government employee. 62 Thus, the nature of the agency or employee's
decision dictates application of the exception.63
Varig Airlines clearly extended the discretionary function exception
to government agency or employee decisions beyond initial planning at
the executive level.6M Non-discretionary acts in execution of discretion-
ary decisions made at the planning level are immune from tort liabil-
57. "[I]t is irrelevant whether the government employee actually balanced eco-
nomic, social, and political concerns in reaching his or her decision." United States
Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1988) (decision by
On Scene Coordinator responsible for determining the nature and scheduling of cleanup
procedures protected), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235 (1988). See also Myslakowski v.
United States, 806 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1986) (officials involved in second-hand sale of
postal jeeps who failed to address safety concerns fell within the discretionary function
exception), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948 (1987); Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417,
1422 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987) (court ruled that "it is irrelevant whether an alleged failure to
warn was a matter of 'deliberate choice' or a mere oversight"), cert. denied 484 U.S.
1004 (1988); Fishback and Killefer, supra note 53, at 299 (The absence of a conscious
decision "to do or not do something will not preclude an action from the discretionary
function exception.")
58. 467 U.S. 797 (1984). The court found both the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion's development of a spot-check plan and the execution of the plan by subordinates to
be immune from liability under the FTCA. Id. at 820.
59. "While the Court's reading of the Act admittedly has not followed a straight
line, we do not accept the supposition that Dalehite no longer represents a valid inter-
pretation of the discretionary function exception." Id. at 811-12.
60. Id. at 800.
61. Id. at 810. The FTCA applies to regulatory agencies, but only discretionary
decisions by the agencies are protected. In Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531
(1988), the court emphasized that the analysis is the same whether the government
action is characterized as regulatory or proprietary. Id. at 538-39.
62. Varig Airlines, supra note 42, at 813.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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ity.65 Moreover, agency or employee decisions made at the operational
level may involve policy considerations and thus may be
discretionary.66
The most recent articulation of the Supreme Court's discretionary
function test appeared in Berkovitz v. United States.67 In Berkovitz, the
Court reformulated the Dalehite 8 and Varig Airlines69 analysis into a
two-pronged test.7' The first prong analyzes the extent to which the
action is a matter of choice for the employee.71 Regardless of the em-
ployee's job status, any decision involving consideration of policy and
requiring judgment satisfies the test's first prong.7 2
The Berkovitz Court isolated a strong exception to the protection
afforded by the discretionary function label. Failure to follow a course
of action explicitly mandated by federal statute, regulation or policy
does not constitute a discretionary act.73 When a violation of a specific
mandate occurs, the employee has failed to adhere to a procedure
which allowed no room for choice or policy consideration.74 The ab-
sence of any permissible policy consideration forecloses the use of the
65. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953).
66. Varig Airlines, supra note 42, at 813.
67. 486 U.S. 531 (1988). In Berkovitz, a user of polio vaccine brought an action
against the government for negligent approval and distribution of the vaccine. Id. at
533. The government based its defense on the discretionary function exception. Id. at
533-34. The Court's analysis of the discretionary function exception is applicable to any
FTCA action, including decisions regarding the disposal of hazardous waste.
68. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text for discussion
of Dalehite.
69. 467 U.S. 797 (1984). See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of Varig Airlines.
70. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37.
71. Id. at 536.
72. Id.
73. Id. This test is referred to as the "mandatory requirement" test. In Berkovitz
the plaintiff successfully established that the federal agency failed to comply with safety
regulations specifically requiring the agency to require submission of and to review re-
ports from the manufacturer of the vaccine. Id. at 541-43.
74. In Berkovitz the Court discussed the process for licensing the polio vaccine. Id.
at 541-44. Statutory and regulatory provisions require that the Division of Biological
Standards examine the product and determine compliance with the regulations. Id. A
failure to examine the vaccine or to require relevant data to be delivered to the Food
and Drug Administration violates a specific statutory mandate. Id. at 542. An agency
has discretion in its analysis of the data, but compiling data from the manufacturer is
absolutely required. Id. at 545-46.
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discretionary function exception to bar action under the FrCA.7 5 If,
however, the procedure or regulation allows the employee to decide
how to carry out the directive, then the discretionary function excep-
tion will apply.7 6 Accordingly, if a private plaintiff in an FTCA action
proves that the government failed to follow a specific and mandatory
requirement not involving any element of choice, then he will satisfy
the first prong of the Berkovitz test.
The second prong of the Berkovitz test questions whether the govern-
ment's decision represents the type of action which Congress intended
to shield from tort liability." The exception should cover decisions
involving the permissible exercise of public policy considerations.78
Congress did not intend for private plaintiffs to use the FTCA as a
vehicle to attack legislative policy decisions through tort actions.79
B. Independent Contractor Exception
T he FTCA permits private action against the federal government for
75. If the mandatory requirement allowed no room for choice in application or exe-
cution, there is no discretionary act for the exception to protect. Id. at 536-37. Interest-
ingly, the Berkovitz Court mentioned Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955), in a footnote supporting its discretionary function analysis. 486 U.S. at 538 n.3.
Ordinarily, courts cite Indian Towing in reference to the planning/operational distinc-
tion. Id. In Indian Towing the government agency violated specific mandatory regula-
tions in its operation of a lighthouse. This distinction is consistent with the Berkovitz
analysis if the focus is shifted to the mandatory nature of the regulations violated rather
than the fact that the violation occurred at the operational level. See Pooler v. United
States, 787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1986) (no discretionary action exists if the conduct violates
the Constitution, a statute or an applicable regulation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 849 (1986)
(citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)). See also Fishback and Killefer,
supra note 53, at 302-03.
76. For example, in cleanup operations, both CERCLA and EPA directives give the
On Scene Coordinator broad discretion to determine the best way to carry out the stat-
ute's goals. Decisions within the responsibility to'execute the cleanup are protected.
See U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1988)
(discretionary function exception protects decision by On Scene Coordinator responsi-
ble for determining the timing of an element of a cleanup procedure). See also Pooler,
787 F.2d at 871 (discretionary function exception applied when officer in charge of in-
vestigation had choices as to how to carry out investigation).
77. 486 U.S. at 537. Although this prong begs the question, it allows courts to
consider the specific facts of a given situation in light of the policy behind the discretion-
ary function exception.
78. Id. at 537. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text for discussion of the
policy for including the exception to the general immunity waiver.
79. See Varig Airlines, supra note 42, at 814.
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actions of its agencies and employees.80 The FTCA specifically ex-
cludes independent contractors from its definition of federal agency."1
In Laird v. Nelms,82 the Supreme Court held that the FTCA language
precludes a finding of any form of absolute governmental liability re-
suiting from certain types of activity, including "ultrahazardous" activ-
ity.83 Nevertheless, the Court noted that common law provides several
exceptions to the general rule precluding employer liability for the neg-
ligent acts of an independent contractor."
In Gibson v. United States,"5 the Third Circuit discussed the com-
mon law exceptions to potential liabilities of a government employer.
The court summarily dismissed the possibility of attaching vicarious
liability upon the government under the theory of respondeat supe-
rior." Even though a government agency retains broad supervisory
control over the actions of an independent contractor, that control is
not enough to characterize the contractor as an agent of the govern-
ment and impute liability to the United States."7
The Gibson court also examined a theory holding an employer liable
for a contractor's negligence when the contractor performs an "inher-
ently dangerous activity."88 Whether a party bases this liability upon a
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982). The Supreme Court drew the distinction between an
independent contractor and an agent of the United States government. Gibson v.
United States, 567 F.2d 1237, 1242 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Orleans,
425 U.S. 807, 815 (1976)).
82. 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
83. Id. at 802-03.
84. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS 468 (4th ed. 1971).
85. 567 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff brought FTCA claim for damage caused
by alleged assault by enrolling at federal job corps center), cert denied, 436 U.S. 925
(1978). Gibson relied on United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1972) for its analysis.
Gibson presented an analysis in a logical format for application to cases analogous to the
problems caused by hazardous waste disposal.
86. Id. at 1242. The court refused to impose liability on the government based on
the agency's failure to supervise the independent contractor. Id.
87. Id. The court also indicated that no liability is created even when the govern-
ment retains the right to exert detailed control over operations. Id. Courts consistently
refuse to hold the United States vicariously liable for injuries to employees based solely
upon the supervisory control of the government. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 441
F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1971) (denying FTCA claim by sub-contractor employee injured
while working on flood control dam).
88. In Gibson, the court interpreted this theory as based on RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 416, 427 (1965). Gibson, 567 F.2d at 1243. These sections isolate
activities which the employer should identify as presenting "peculiar risk to others."
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theory of respondeat superior89 or a "non-delegable duty"' it nonethe-
less remains a form of vicarious or absolute liability.9' The Supreme
Court has held, however, that the government cannot be liable under
the FTCA for damages which do not result from the negligence of a
government agency or employee. 92
Nonetheless, courts may impose liability on the government for a
government employee's independent negligent acts relating to an in-
dependent contractor. 93 Common law, moreover, may impose a duty
on the employer, independent of vicarious responsibility, to take rea-
sonable precautions to protect third parties from foreseeable risks of
harm.9 4 As the court in Gibson discusses, even if this duty exists, its
application to a government entity raises other questions.9 5 For exam-
ple, the execution of the duty to protect may raise discretionary action
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965)). The employer is liable for
resulting harm regardless of the purported delegation by contract, or otherwise, of the
responsibility to take reasonable precautions. Id.
89. The FTCA does not make the government liable for actions of an independent
contractor. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982). Any liability theory which imputes negligence of
an independent contractor to the government based on respondeat superior falls outside
the limits of the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity. See Gibson, 567 F.2d at 1242.
90. A "non-delegable" duty is a duty which the courts have determined is of such
importance to the community that an employer is not allowed to transfer it. W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 471 (4th ed. 1971).
91. Gibson, 567 F.2d at 1244. Liability of the employer based upon the ul-
trahazardous character of the activity is grounded in strict liability. Laird v. Nelms, 406
U.S. 797, 800 (1972). An ultrahazardous activity is an activity which remains danger-
ous regardless of precautions taken. Id.
92. Gibson, 567 F.2d at 1244. "Regardless of state law characterization, the Federal
Tort Claims Act itself precludes the imposition of liability if there has been no negli-
gence or other form of 'misfeasance' or 'nonfeasance. . . .'" Laird, 406 U.S. at 799
(quoting Dalehite v. United States, 364 U.S. 15 (1953)). Laird, a 1972 Supreme Court
case, is frequently cited for the proposition that the government cannot be held liable
under a theory of absolute liability.
93. See Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 532-33 (1973) (remanding case to
determine possible negligence of federal employee in connection with independent con-
tractor); Aretz v. United States, 604 F.2d 417, 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding govern-
ment negligent for failure to inform contractor of change in hazardous classification of
chemical used).
94. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 469 (4th ed. 1971).
95. Gibson, 567 F.2d at 1245. The court addressed this argument although it was
not directly raised in the district court. Id. at 1244. Although the court indicated that
allegations of direct negligence could prove difficult, the court did not reach any conclu-
sion about possible defenses or specific instances where negligence would be found. Id.
at 1245.
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defenses to a tort action.9 6 Additionally, barring delegation of the duty
to the independent contractor appears to make the government abso-
lutely liable for insufficient precautions.97
III. DICKERSON, INa v. UNITED STATES
In Dickerson, Inc. v. United States,98 the court held the federal gov-
ernment liable under the FTCA.99 The plaintiff's claim involved dam-
ages caused by improper disposal of hazardous waste."° The
Dickerson court rested its decision on Florida tort law, T1' and refused
to apply either the discretionary function exception or the independent
contractor exception to bar liability.'0 2
The Defense Property Disposal Service (DPDS), an agency of the
Department of Defense,"0 3 contracted with several independent com-
panies for transportation and disposal of contaminated waste oil from
military installations."° American Electric Corporation (AEC) con-
tracted with DPDS to dispose of the waste.105 Dickerson, Inc., an
asphalt and paving company, purchased waste oil containing PCBs'
0 6
96. See supra notes 41-79 and accompanying text for discussion of the discretionary
function exception.
97. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
98. 875 F.2d 1577 (11th Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 1584.
100. Id.
101. The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for certain tort claims by private par-
ties. The primary restriction requires that the claim involve an action which applicable
state tort law would find a private party liable. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1983). Therefore,
the Dickerson court used Florida tort law to hold the government liable. 875 F.2d at
1583.
102. 875 F.2d at 1584.
103. Id. at 1579. This agency relationship established the United States as a respon-
sible party. The DPDS assumed responsibility for disposal of PCB waste from military
installations around the country. The delegation to DPDS was pursuant to Defense
Environmental Quality Program and Policy Memoranda 80-5 and 80-9. Dickerson,
Inc. v. Holloway, 685 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
104. Dickerson, 875 F.2d at 1579. The waste oil was contaminated with PCBs,
highly toxic chemicals used in electrical transformers. Id. Studies show that PCB con-
tamination can cause cancer, decreased fertility, still births, and birth defects in test
animals. Id. at 1583.
105. Id. at 1579. AEC received two contracts from DPDS. Id. A different DPDS
employee administered each, but neither had experience with hazardous waste disposal.
Id.
106. Id. Dickerson used waste oil to heat the asphalt. Id. Holloway Waste Oil
Company served as its main supplier. Id.
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at levels far exceeding EPA limits.'1 7 The seller, Holloway Waste Oil
Company, purchased the waste oil from AEC.'0° Dickerson sued the
United States for negligently selecting AEC to dispose of the waste."°9
Dickerson alleged that DPDS failed to supervise the waste disposal
by AEC to ensure proper disposal of the PCB contaminated waste
oil. "I The district court held that the discretionary function exception
protected the DPDS decision awarding the contracts to AEC."1' The
exception, however, did not protect subsequent supervision of the exe-
cution of the contract.12 Therefore, the district court found the gov-
ernment liable under a Florida tort law theory of a nondelegable duty
to third parties." 3 The duty applies to employers who hire an in-
dependent contractor to perform inherently dangerous activities.' 14 In
Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed. 1' 15
A. Discretionary Function Exception
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the discretionary function ex-
ception in Dickerson. Although the decision did not explicitly adopt
the Berkovitz test, 16 the court's analysis appears to be the same.1
The court followed the Berkovitz rationale by refusing to apply the dis-
cretionary function exception to agency violations of federal statutes,
107. Id. at 1579-80. The EPA delineates three categories of PCB contamination;
each requires segregated storage and disposal of the waste. Oil containing over 500
parts of FPCB per million comprises the category of greatest toxicity. All oil tanks at
the Dickerson site contained waste oil in this category. Id.
108. Id. at 1579.
109. Id. at 1580. The EPA stayed the CERCLA proceedings forcing Dickerson, as
owner, to clean up the waste, pending outcome of the suit against the government.
Dickerson, Inc. v. Holloway, 685 F. Supp. 1555, 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1987). Dickerson was
unable to finance the $800,000 estimated cost of cleanup. Id.
110. Dickerson, 875 F.2d at 1580.
111. Dickerson, 685 F. Supp. at 1565.
112. Id. at 1565-66.
113. Id. at 1566. Although the district court also described affirmative duties cre-
ated by EPA regulations, the appellate court affirmed the finding of negligence based
solely on Florida tort law. Dickerson, 875 F.2d at 1584.
114. Dickerson, 685 F. Supp. at 1566.
115. Dickerson, 875 F.2d at 1584.
116. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Berkovitz.
117. The court repeatedly cites Berkovitz to support its conclusions. The court pri-
marily uses the Berkovitz "mandatory regulation" analysis to support its decision not to
apply the exception. Dickerson, 875 F.2d at 1580-81.
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regulations and policies.118
The Dickerson court outlined three reasons to support its decision
that the DPDS actions surrounding the waste oil disposal were not
discretionary acts. First, the court discussed general CERCLA liabil-
ity and the responsibility of anyone who arranges for transfer of haz-
ardous waste. 1 9 The court then stressed the ongoing safety obligation
of a responsible party under CERCLA and the unique concerns involv-
ing hazardous waste. 2 Although the DPDS qualified as a responsible
party under CERCLA,121 the court did not identify specific instances
of CERCLA violations as required by the Berkovitz analysis.' 22
Rather, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the statute's import and the
ramifications of CERCLA violations alone failed to remove a decision
from the scope of the discretionary function exception.
The existence of EPA regulations requiring the use of a manifest
tracking system formed the second basis for the Dickerson court's deci-
sion. 2' The regulations describe a specific procedure to which DPDS
must adhere in order to comply with an ongoing responsibility in toxic
waste disposal.24 As in its treatment of CERCLA, the court did not
discuss violations of specific provisions of the tracking regulations. 25
118. Id. at 1581.
119. Id. See supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text for scope of liability under
CERCLA.
120. Dickerson, 875 F.2d at 1581. CERCLA liability applies to parties long after
their actual contact with the waste. Original generators of the waste, transporters, and
past owners of the property are all held liable for CERCLA cleanup costs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (1982).
121. CERCLA § 107(a) (3) characterizes individuals who arrange for transport of
hazardous waste as responsible parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3) (1982).
122. "CERCLA provisions suggest an ongoing safety obligation.., which would be
inconsistent with the Government's argument that it was a discretionary decision for
DPDS to transfer all potential liability to its independent contractor.. . ." 875 F.2d at
1581. Regardless of the accuracy of this analysis of CERCLA goals, it does not state a
violation of a specific non-discretionary directive.
123. Id.
124. EPA regulations require the party contracting for disposal to use a manifest
tracking system. 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.20 - 262.23 (1989). The system authorizes a facility
to handle the waste, one alternate facility, and a contingency plan for the unavailability
of both facilities. 40 C.F.R. § 262.20 (1989). The EPA form, included as part of the
document, essentially resembled a shipping document listing generators, transporters,
amount and description of the waste, and routing and transportation of the waste.
Dickerson, Inc. v. Holloway, 685 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
125. The district court opinion contained an extensive list of factual findings. 685
F. Supp. at 1557-63. The court outlined the requirements of the manifest system and
DPDS' actions and omissions. Id. at 1560. Although the DPDS directors of the con-
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Third, the Dickerson court found the DPDS' internal "cradle-to-
grave policy" persuasive. 26 In reaching its conclusion, the court 127
again relied upon Berkovitzt which held that a violation of policies di-
recting a specific procedure is not a discretionary act.128 The Berkovitz
Court, however, also required that the specific procedure violated must
allow no room for policy judgment and decision. 129 In Dickerson, the
court failed to identify violations of specific directives stemming from
DPDS' broad responsibility. If DPDS employee decisions regarding
methods to implement the "cradle-to-grave" responsibility involved
policy considerations, these decisions could have been discretionary
acts. 130
The district court opinion elucidates the Eleventh Circuit's analy-
sis. 1 3 ' The district court based its examination of the discretionary
function exception primarily on the planning rather than the opera-
tional distinction.132 If Varig Airlines 133 questioned the use of this dis-
tracts did not follow up on final waste disposal after pickup by AEC, it remains unclear
whether this omission specifically violated the regulations. Id. The Court of Appeals
purported to base its decision on this issue on violation of mandatory regulations. 875
F.2d at 1581. The Court of Appeals, however, did not raise any of the specific facts or
possible violations. Id. Rather, the court focused on the ongoing responsibility policy
behind the manifest document requirement. Id.
126. "Cradle to grave" refers to RCRA policy covering hazardous waste from the
point of generation to ultimate disposal. Id. Generally, "cradle-to-grave" liability
makes a responsible party liable from the generation to storage or ultimate disposal. Id.
RCRA also employs the manifest system to ensure disposal in approved facilities. See
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1501 (lth Cir. 1986), cited with
approyal in Dickerson, 875 F.2d at 1581.
The Government denied the existence of the internal policy. Id. at 1581. However,
the lower court found that the policy existed as evidenced by a letter written by one of
the project supervisors. Id. See also Dickerson, 685 F. Supp. at 1566. The letter recog-
nized that DPDS had an ongoing responsibility to ensure proper disposal and stated
that DPDS could potentially face civil liability if the independent contractor disposed of
the waste improperly. Id.
127. Dickerson, 875 F.2d at 1581.
128. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1988).
129. Id.
130. The Berkovitz Court agreed with the Varig Airlines statement that an employee
at any level can make a discretionary decision. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537. Further, the
Court in Varig Airlines noted that a decision could be made at the planning level which
requires discretionary decisions at the operational level. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820.
131. Dickerson, Inc. v. Holloway, 685 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
132. Id. at 1564-65. The court used a test from Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v.
United States, 769 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1985), based primarily upon a plan-
ning/operational distinction. In Alabama Electric, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
although decisions made at the operational level may include an amount of discretion,
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tinction as a test to label government actions as discretionary, Berkovitz
arguably destroyed it.134 The district court decision predated Berkovitz
and all planning versus operational labels ultimately disappeared in the
appellate court decision. However, the interpretation of the responsi-
bility policies generated by CERCLA, the EPA, and DPDS as barring
any discretionary acts by employees of DPDS strongly recalls a pure
planning versus operational distinction.135
The second prong of the Berkovitz test recognized that even if an act
is discretionary, it nevertheless must fall within the scope of action
which Congress intended the exception to protect.136 The policies be-
hind CERCLA and "cradle-to-grave" responsibility lend themselves to
the argument that Congress did not intend to protect agency decisions
resulting in negligent supervision of hazardous waste disposal. 137
they do not require the evaluation of important policy factors and are therefore not
protected. 769 F.2d at 1528. The Alabama Electric court further stated that if an em-
ployee acts based upon a "fixed or readily ascertainable standard" the discretionary
function exception does not protect the action. Id. at 1529. This standard falls short of
the Berkovitz mandatory regulation test. The court also distinguished between "impor-
tant" and "unimportant" policy considerations. 769 F.2d at 1527-28. In addition, the
court focused the discretionary function exception on planning decisions by "execu-
tives" after purported recognition of the lack of status-bias in the Dalehite analysis. Id.
at 1531 n.3. Alabama Electric is inconsistent with post-Varig Airlines analysis and is
further suspect after Berkovitz. See Fishback and Killefer, supra note 53, at 320-21.
133. The statement in Varig Airlines that "it is the nature of the conduct, rather
than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception
applies .... "seems inconsistent with a purely planning/operational distinction. Varig
Airlines, supra note 42, at 813. Withholding discretionary decision protection from any
decision made at the operational level avoids any analysis of the specific nature of the
decision. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Varig
Airlines.
134. The references to Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), may
lead to some confusion regarding the Court's opinion on the planning/operational dis-
tinction. The thrust of the whole Berkovitz analysis, however, allows for protected dis-
cretionary decisions at all stages of the government activity. See supra note 54 for
discussion of Indian Towing. See also Fishback and Killefer, supra note 53, at 322.
135. For each of these policies, the Eleventh Circuit identified a policy made at the
planning level. The court characterized subsequent actions in execution of the policies,
or decisions to delegate the responsibility, as non-discretionary. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S.
at 537. The court did not employ the words "planning" and "operational" in its deci-
sion, but the court's logic fits with these labels.
136. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
137. The purpose of the discretionary function exception is to avoid judicial "sec-
ond-guessing" of policy decisions made by the federal government or its employees.
Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814. Arguably, given the serious health and safety concerns
raised by hazardous waste disposal, Congress and the courts should not allow the gov-
ernment to circumvent duties with which a private person disposing of waste must coin-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol39/iss1/6
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Rather, the discretionary character of a decision and its protection by
the exception represent two different issues. Although the Dickerson
court concluded that these actions should not be protected by the dis-
cretionary function exception,"' it used the "mandatory requirement"
test to find a total lack of discretion.1 39
B. Independent Contractor Exception
The decision by DPDS to award disposal contracts to AEC was
clearly an action protected by the independent contractor exception. 14
Because AEC was not an employee of the government, its negligence in
disposing of the waste oil fell outside the FTCA immunity waiver.' 4 1
Further, the court cannot impute AEC negligence to the government
based upon a theory of vicarious or absolute liability. 142 In order to
succeed in a FTCA claim, the plaintiff must prove that the govern-
ment, agency or employee was primarily negligent.14 3
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the independent contractor question
in Emelwon, Inc. v. United States.'" In Emelwon, the court found
governmental liability based upon a nondelegable duty of an employer
to ensure that his independent contractor performed inherently danger-
ous activities in a non-negligent manner.1 45 Following the Emelwon
rationale, the Dickerson court carefully stressed that this nondelegable
duty differs from an employee's duty in a vicarious liability case where
the court imputes the independent contractor's negligence to the gov-
ernment.' 46 Rather, the failure of the government employer to fulfill
its nondelegable duty served as the basis for the government's
negligence.147
ply. However, this raises the counterargument of the courts' refusal to make the
government absolutely liable. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
138. Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1582 (11th Cir. 1989).
139. Id. The "mandatory requirement" test refers to the Berkovitz analysis of viola-
tions of specific mandatory regulations.
140. Dickerson, Inc. v. Holloway, 685 F. Supp. 1555, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
141. See supra notes 36-40 for a discussion of the scope of the FTCA sovereign
immunity waiver.
142. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
144. 391 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968).
145. Id. at 11.
146. 875 F.2d at 1582.
147. Id. at 1583.
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Emelwon justifies the imposition of a nondelegable duty on the fed-
eral government by explaining that under Florida law, the employer is
not liable under an absolute liability standard. The employer must
take reasonable precautions to ensure that the independent contractor
acts in a non-negligent manner.148 The sole fact, however, that the
government cannot delegate this responsibility restricts government
discretion to make policy decisions concerning safety.149 The decision
to delegate safety responsibility to the independent contractor can be
discretionary. 0 Without a violation of a mandatory provision that
the government take specific safety precautions, it is questionable how
the Supreme Court would view the Emelwon analysis in light of
Berkovitz.
C. Applicable State Law
After overcoming exceptions to the FTCA immunity waiver, the
crux of the FTCA claim requires a plaintiff to raise a tort action under
148. 391 F.2d at 11 n.2. The court declined to apply this analysis to a jurisdiction
with a different nondelegable duty. Id. In State v. Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp.
255 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), the district court addressed the independent contractor exception
in a situation very similar to the Dickerson case. The Shore Realty court found that
under New York tort law, the employer maintained a nondelegable duty to ensure that
an independent contractor properly carry out inherently dangerous activities. Id. at
266. This duty, according to the Shore Realty court, creates strict liability for the em-
ployer. Id. Therefore, the court found the duty to be inapplicable to a government
agency. Id. The court did recognize that the agency's selection of that particular con-
tractor could be negligent. Id. In a footnote, however, the court raised the discretion-
ary function defense to this allegation of negligence. Id. at 266 n.9.
149. The government's delegation of safety to independent contractors primarily
arises in cases of injury to employees of the independent contractor. The test developed
in these cases mirrors the Berkovitz test. Absent blatant disregard of a specific safety
regulation, the decision to delegate safety responsibility almost always retains protec-
tion. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1987)
(barring action by university employees injured in field tests of Agent Orange); In re
Consol. United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987) (up-
holding government's failure to supervise independent contractor's compliance with
safety regulations).
150. Fishback and Killefer, supra note 53, at 308. In Scofi v. McKeon, 666 F.2d
170, 172 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982), the court distinguished Emelwon from cases where govern-
ment liability was barred for injury to employees of the contractor. Id. The Scofi court
agreed that danger to third party members of the public, as was the case in Emelwon,
was not delegable, although the employee's safety could be delegated to the independent
contractor. Id. But see Lockett v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(holding the discretionary functior exception protects the EPA's decision not to warn
residents of chemicals emanating from waste site).
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applicable state law.151 In Dickerson, the Eleventh Circuit based liabil-
ity upon DPDS' negligent failure to take reasonable precautions to en-
sure the safety of others. 52 Although the negligence arising from the
failure to supervise imputes tort liability to a private person,153 the
FTCA limits the applicability of this negligence to the federal
government. 154
In addition to DPDS' negligent failure to take reasonable safety pre-
cautions, the Dickerson court based its negligence finding on evidence
independent of CERCLA or EPA regulation violations.155 The court
thus avoided using the FTCA to permit compensation for violation of
federal statutes.' 56 The court, however, repeatedly used CERCLA and
EPA imposed duties and policies to establish the DPDS as a responsi-
ble party for the damage to Dickerson's property. 57 Moreover, the
court attacked the government defense of discretionary decision immu-
nity using these same statutory duties and policies. 5 ' Therefore, the
Dickerson court acted incongruously by using breaches of statutory du-
ties to avoid the government's defense, and then by refusing to use the
same statutory duties to impose liability.159
The trend of recent cases ending with Berkovitz focused on the na-
ture of the decisions to act or not to act.' 60 Berkovitz provides the
private plaintiff with a framework for an argument which defeats a dis-
cretionary function defense. The Dickerson court only semantically
151. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
152. Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d at 1577, 1583 (1lth Cir. 1989). The
duty arose because DPDS was an employer of an independent contractor engaging in
inherently dangerous activity. Id. For example, the court found that the DPDS failed
to notice incorrect addresses on invoices, and discrepancies in amounts of PCB waste
estimated and actually discarded. Id.
153. Id.
154. Even conceding that a non-delegable duty to protect third parties from harm
exists, the execution of this duty could also involve policy considerations. See supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 90-92 for discussion of non-
delegable duty and its application to government agencies.
155. 875 F.2d at 1584.
156. Id. See Sellfors v. United States, 697 F.2d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 1983) (Con-
gress did not intend for the FTCA to redress breaches of federal statutory duties).
157. Dickerson, 875 F.2d at 1581.
158. See supra notes 116-130 and accompanying text.
159. Congress intended FTCA action to impose liability based upon state tort law,
and deemed it improper to assert a claim based on CERCLA or EPA regulation
violations.
160. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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changes Berkovitz by deleting its labels but maintaining the same
rationale. 16
1
Regardless of how egregious a government official's negligence may
be, the FTCA does not procure redress if the decisions receive the pro-
tection of the discretionary function exception. 62 CERCLA indispu-
tably articulates strong Congressional concern over the problem of
hazardous waste. 163 In addition, CERCLA responsibilities and duties
clearly apply to government agencies and employees. 1" Congress,
however, intended the exception to the FTCA sovereign immunity
waiver to prevent a court, through the medium of a private tort action,
from usurping the decision of what a government agency or employee
should do. 165 When statutes or regulations direct government action
and the government fails to comply, Berkovitz opens the door to tort
action.166 Despite the emotional and environmental impact of hazard-
ous waste issues, to the extent that the Dickerson court allows an
FTCA claim to police the implementation of general policy, it over-
steps the bounds of the Berkovitz decision.
Tomea C. Mayer*
161. Although the Dickerson court articulated the Berkovitz analysis, the court
drew the line at policy decisions made at the planning level. Dickerson did not explore
specific deviations from requirements or the possibility of discretionary decisions in exe-
cution of the policy. See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 1-2, 5 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
165. Varg Airlines, supra note 42, at 814. DPDS could have done much more to
ensure that AEC disposed of the PCB waste properly. DPDS could have followed up
on the ultimate disposal of the PCB waste picked up by AEC. Dickerson, Inc. v. Hollo-
way, 685 F. Supp. 1555, 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1987). No DPDS employee assumed the
responsibility to check with the designated storage facility, however. Id. DPDS also
received warnings from sources that the AEC improperly executed disposal. Id. DPDS
decided that this information came from a disgruntled employee. Id. Even if these acts
constitute an abuse of discretion, that abuse does not impact on the discretionary excep-
tion analysis.
166. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text for analysis of the Berkovitz
"mandatory requirement" test.
* J.D. 1991, Washington University.
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